Both China and the European Union have a major role to play in 　　achieving global equilibrium and peace
　　
　　TRANSNATIONAL: Lang Lang, talented Chinese pianist, plays to celebrate the 30th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations between China and the EU in Brussels last October
　　Escalation in the Middle East, chaos in Iraq, uncertainty in Afghanistan, tensions over Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs, the spread of terrorism, large-scale economic exclusion, a deadlock in the Doha trade development agenda, rhetorical disputes between Washington and Moscow, the evaporation of U.S. soft power and the discrediting of the very values it is supposed to project. Despite Francis Fukuyama’s famous post-Cold War prediction, history has not ended. On the contrary, it is a time when various models of society are facing one another and opposing ideas are circulating intensively.
　　At the two edges of the Eurasian continent, the European Union (EU), a model for cooperation among countries, and China, a reference for developing countries, have a greater role to play in this highly critical global situation.
　　On both sides, it requires vision and leadership. Helsinki will host the ninth EU-China summit on September 9. Finland’s high-level gathering has to be an event marked by a clear definition of the EU-China strategic relationship and by bold decisions on a wide range of issues.
　　Despite the ultra-rapid rhythm imposed by the logic of 24-hour news and information, European and Chinese policymakers should always put the Euro-China relationship into perspective. An agenda uniquely driven by trade or immediate technocratic concerns does not fully express the nature of the European and Chinese cultures.
　　Only a shared awareness of fundamental cultural and historical commonalities can lead to the deepening of the links between the two edges of Eurasia and have a moderating effect on Washington’s imperial hubris. Better understanding between Europe and China is also necessary for both sides to take the full measure of what the two ancient civilizations can achieve together.
　　But in various segments of European society, there is hesitancy about China’s intentions, and it seems that China is still too unknown to be trusted. Augustine’s words on reason and faith, intellige ut credas, or “understand so that you should believe,” might apply also to the actors in international relations: mutual understanding begets trust and the two, in fact, reinforce each other.
　　China’s re-emergence---there is no “China rise,” only China’s restoration to its historical position---is already having a considerable impact on the global village. Understandably, observers and analysts discuss the nature of Beijing’s behavior on the international scene. Will China behave like an empire trying to dominate and extend a pax Sinica, or act as a cooperative force working for a foedus pacificum, a league of peace, to use Immanuel Kant’s expression?
　　In other words, will China tend to behave like the United States, at the center of a unilateral pax Americana, or more like the members of the EU, embarked on a program to build a republic of nations? Peace or war on a massive scale in the 21st century will depend largely on the answer to this question.
　　Obviously, a pax Sinica would collide with the pax Americana; in such a scenario, indirect or direct conflicts between the two hegemonies seem unavoidable. But if a cooperative Chinese civilization joins the efforts of a cooperative Europe, not only could an unprecedented area of peace and prosperity be opened in Eurasia, but also the United States could rediscover the wisdom of the Jeffersonian spirit, or face the risk of being isolated from the dynamics of a post-imperial Eurasian world-continent.
　　
　　Experience with diversity
　　
　　One may try to anticipate the nature of Beijing’s posture in world affairs by looking at what can be called China’s experience of diversity. Here, we are looking for a factor that partly explains China’s current relatively good relationship with its 14 land neighbors (given the heterogeneity of China’s periphery, this is already a remarkable diplomatic achievement), its strong engagement in the United Nations system and World Trade Organization, its commitment to the ASEAN+3 process, the six-party talks on North Korea or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
　　Beyond more obvious and immediate tactical concerns, or strategic choices, Zhou Enlai’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” or more recently the SCO’s “Shanghai Spirit” (mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity and common development) might also be linked with a tradition of having to handle pluralism and to cope with complexity.
　　Since it shares with the Old World an accumulation of experiences in dealing with a high level of internal diversity, the Chinese world is more likely to adopt the European quest for equilibrium on the global chessboard. The United States, which never had to manage internally a multilateral subsystem, is just not well equipped to accept and live within a genuine global multilateral system. For Washington the only conceivable alternative is between chaos (to be understood as a world without U.S. leadership) or the leadership of one pole over the others (another way to formulate and justify the pax Americana).
　　By contrast, because of their past internal diplomatic arrangements, Europe and China see almost instinctively the nuances between these extremes and the advantages of maintaining equilibrium among various poles of power.
　　In the United States, many would first have to recognize that reality is complex and uncertain and that compromise is not necessarily a betrayal of ideals, or negotiation a waste of time.
　　It is a paradox that despite a long obsession with an immutable order---unity under the emperor mainly served by an ideology, orthodox Confucianism and an obedient bureaucracy---China could well be prepared to act as a co-architect of a multipolar world.
　　With similarities in their past trajectories, Europe and China probably developed a perception that is closer than it may seem. On December 1, 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao gave an interview to the French newspaper Le Figaro. As an introduction, he made a reference to the scholar Gu Hongming (1857-1928): “It seems that only the French people could understand China and the Chinese civilization because the French share an extraordinary quality with the Chinese, namely subtlety.”
　　Delicacy of perception and an aptitude for nuances are not, of course, exclusively Sino-French characteristics. Wen was being polite and “subtle” with his guests.
　　
　　Longevity and renewal
　　
　　However, millennia have polished the European and Chinese collective mind to an extent yet to be matched by the New World, in spite of its many achievements. General refined judgment did not prevent the two edges of Eurasia from falling repeatedly into the madness of wars, internal turmoil and even coming close to self-annihilation, but accumulated wisdom certainly contributed to their respective longevity and current renewal.
　　For those trying to describe China’s mega-society, the difficulty is twofold: Things are indeed changing, but these changes, because of the heterogeneity of the Chinese world, are not similar. Discontinuities in geography, demography and economy make the work of policymakers arduous.
　　People not directly in contact with the reality of China tend to look at the country as a homogeneous entity. They imagine one Chinese type from Harbin to Guangzhou or from Shanghai to Chengdu living in similar environment and conditions. This is, of course, a stereotype. China is not another nation-state, and an analogy with Europe can help us to frame the Chinese world in a way that is both useful and meaningful.
　　China is physically almost as large as Europe and much larger than the EU’s 25 members. The population of the EU does not exceed a third of China’s 1.3 billion inhabitants. These basic elements introduce us to the scale and variety of the Chinese world.
　　Conventionally, one speaks of 56 ethnic groups composing China’s gigantic human mosaic. If the Han group---being itself much less uniform than it seems---makes up more than 90 percent of the total population, one has to keep in mind that other minorities represent in total more than 100 million people. China’s largest minority, the Zhuang group mainly located in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, is made up of 16 million people, and more than 18 ethnic groups consist of more than a million people each.
　　On one side, Beijing needs to ensure that the large Han majority does not fall into the pitfalls of exclusive nationalism within the Chinese world, and on the other side, it needs to prevent separatism.
　　
　　Managing multiculturalism
　　
　　Said differently, the Hans have to eschew imperial and colonial temptations while China’s different components have to exist in a way that does not reproduce the Western nation-state construction. This is not easy, but China is well equipped to find middle ways between uniformity and fragmentation. By doing that, China will prove not only that it can win the race for material development, but also that it can manage a high level of multiculturalism.
　　From six to 25 members---and soon in 2007 with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to 27---the history of post-World War II European integration is made up of successive enlargements; it is also, gradually, the political reunification of the European civilization. At the other edge of Eurasia, with Hong Kong and Macao’s return to China in 1997 and 1999, respectively, the Chinese world is also going through a process of reunification; using EU jargon, it could be framed as China’s own version of enlargement.
　　The EU must articulate more options with respect to China than seeing it simply as either a threat or an economic opportunity. By reflecting on China’s cohesion, Europe can find the path toward more political integration. In that sense, for the world’s largest trading bloc, the reintegration of one fifth of mankind into the world system is not only a test but also an impulse for further political deepening. Europe is being asked to face its historical responsibility, and this task might help focus the EU’s energies and take them away from other issues, perhaps more urgent, but certainly less important.
　　After the exchanges with the Jesuits in the 16th century, and the clashes with Western aggressive powers in the 1800s, China is facing Europe directly for the third time. However, Beijing is now talking to Brussels as an equal. Failing to realize that a renewed Europe is more than a force that can potentially counterbalance Washington or a partner for business, Beijing would miss a historic opportunity. If China can find inspiration in European society and its constant effort to balance economic efficiency and social justice under the rule of law, then even more Chinese citizens will be able to enjoy all the benefits of modernization. Chinese civilization will subsequently be in a better position to contribute to global equilibrium.
　　Aware of fundamental commonalities, understanding their respective constraints and looking for cross-fertilizations, it is time now for the two old worlds to join their strengths and wisdoms to open a more cooperative page of history.
　　The author is director of Academia Sinica Europaea at the China Europe International Business School, Shanghai, and founding director of the Euro-China Forum. The Fifth Euro-China Forum will take place in Sofia, Bulgaria. You can contact David Gosset at gdavid@ceibs.edu.

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